

**OPINION**

**Date of adoption: 14 December 2014**

**Case No. 229/09**

**Z.B.**

**against**

**UNMIK**

The Human Rights Advisory Panel, sitting on 14 December 2014,

with the following members present:

Christine Chinkin, Presiding Member

Françoise Tulkens

Assisted by

Andrey Antonov, Executive Officer

Having noted Mr Marek Nowicki’s withdrawal from sitting in the case pursuant to Rule 12 of the Rules of Procedure,

Having considered the aforementioned complaint, introduced pursuant to Section 1.2 of UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/12 of 23 March 2006 on the establishment of the Human Rights Advisory Panel,

Having deliberated, makes the following findings and recommendations:

1. **PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE PANEL**
2. The complaint was introduced on 6 April 2009 and registered on 30 April 2009.
3. On 23 December 2009 and 12 May 2010, the Panel requested further information from the complainant. No response was received.
4. On 9 January 2012, the complaint was communicated to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)[[1]](#footnote-1), for UNMIK’s comments on the admissibility of the complaint.
5. On 23 February 2012, the SRSG provided UNMIK’s response.
6. On 17 August 2012, the Panel declared the complaint admissible.
7. On 7 September 2012, the Panel forwarded its decision on admissibility to the SRSG requesting UNMIK’s comments on the merits of the complaint, as well as copies of the investigative files relevant to the case.
8. On 13 August 2013, the SRSG presented UNMIK’s response in relation to the merits of the complaint, together with the copies of the relevant documents.
9. On 4 November 2014, the Panel requested UNMIK to confirm whether the disclosure of the investigative files concerning the case could be considered final.
10. On 6 November 2014, UNMIK provided its response.
11. **THE FACTS**
12. **General background[[2]](#footnote-2)**
13. The events at issue took place in the territory of Kosovo shortly after the establishment on 10 June 1999 of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).
14. The armed conflict during 1998 and 1999 between the Serbian forces on one side and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other Kosovo Albanian armed groups on the other is well documented. Following the failure of international efforts to resolve the conflict, on 23 March 1999, the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) announced the commencement of air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The air strikes began on 24 March 1999 and ended on 8 June 1999 when the FRY agreed to withdraw its forces from Kosovo. On 9 June 1999, the International Security Force (KFOR), the FRY and the Republic of Serbia signed a “Military Technical Agreement” by which they agreed on FRY withdrawal from Kosovo and the presence of an international security force following an appropriate UN Security Council Resolution.
15. On 10 June 1999, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 (1999). Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council decided upon the deployment of international security and civil presences - KFOR and UNMIK respectively - in the territory of Kosovo. Pursuant to Security Council Resolution No. 1244 (1999), the UN was vested with full legislative and executive powers for the interim administration of Kosovo, including the administration of justice. KFOR was tasked with establishing “a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety” and temporarily ensuring “public safety and order” until the international civil presence could take over responsibility for this task. UNMIK comprised four main components or pillars led by the United Nations (civil administration), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (humanitarian assistance, which was phased out in June 2000), the OSCE (institution building) and the EU (reconstruction and economic development). Each pillar was placed under the authority of the SRSG. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) mandated UNMIK to “promote and protect human rights” in Kosovo in accordance with internationally recognised human rights standards.
16. Estimates regarding the effect of the conflict on the displacement of the Kosovo Albanian population range from approximately 800,000 to 1.45 million. Following the adoption of Resolution 1244 (1999), the majority of Kosovo Albanians who had fled, or had been forcibly expelled from their houses by the Serbian forces during the conflict, returned to Kosovo.
17. Meanwhile, members of the non-Albanian community – mainly but not exclusively Serbians, Roma and Slavic Muslims – as well as Kosovo Albanians suspected of collaboration with the Serbian authorities, became the target of widespread attacks by Kosovo Albanian armed groups. Current estimates relating to the number of Kosovo Serbians displaced fall within the region of 200,000 to 210,000. Whereas most Kosovo Serbians and other non-Albanians fled to Serbia proper and the neighbouring countries, those remaining behind became victims of systematic killings, abductions, arbitrary detentions, sexual and gender based violence, beatings and harassment.
18. Although figures remain disputed, it is estimated that more than 15,000 deaths or disappearances occurred during and in the immediate aftermath of the Kosovo conflict (1998-2000). More than 3,000 ethnic Albanians, and about 800 Serbians, Roma and members of other minority communities went missing during this period. More than half of the missing persons had been located and their mortal remains identified by the end of 2010, while 1,766 are listed as still missing by the ICRC as of October 2012.
19. As of July 1999, as part of the efforts to restore law enforcement in Kosovo within the framework of the rule of law, the SRSG urged UN member States to support the deployment within the civilian component of UNMIK of 4,718 international police personnel. UNMIK Police were tasked with advising KFOR on policing matters until they themselves had sufficient numbers to take full responsibility for law enforcement and to work towards the development of a Kosovo police service. By September 1999, approximately 1,100 international police officers had been deployed to UNMIK.
20. By December 2000, the deployment of UNMIK Police was almost complete with 4,400 personnel from 53 different countries, and UNMIK had assumed primacy in law enforcement responsibility in all regions of Kosovo except for Mitrovicë/Mitrovica. According to the 2000 Annual Report of UNMIK Police, 351 kidnappings, 675 murders and 115 rapes had been reported to them in the period between June 1999 and December 2000.
21. Due to the collapse of the administration of justice in Kosovo, UNMIK established in June 1999 an Emergency Justice System. This was composed of a limited number of local judges and prosecutors and was operational until a regular justice system became operative in January 2000. In February 2000, UNMIK authorised the appointment of international judges and prosecutors, initially in the Mitrovicë/Mitrovica region and later across Kosovo, to strengthen the local justice system and to guarantee its impartiality. As of October 2002, the local justice system comprised 341 local and 24 international judges and prosecutors. In January 2003, the UN Secretary-General reporting to the Security Council on the implementation of Resolution 1244 (1999) defined the police and justice system in Kosovo at that moment as being “well-functioning” and “sustainable”.
22. In July 1999, the UN Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that UNMIK already considered the issue of missing persons as a particularly acute human rights concern in Kosovo. In November 1999, a Missing Persons Unit (MPU) was established within UNMIK Police, mandated to investigate with respect to either the possible location of missing persons and/or gravesites. The MPU, jointly with the Central Criminal Investigation Unit (CCIU) of UNMIK Police, and later a dedicated War Crimes Investigation Unit (WCIU), were responsible for the criminal aspects of missing persons cases in Kosovo. In May 2000, a Victim Recovery and Identification Commission (VRIC) chaired by UNMIK was created for the recovery, identification and disposition of mortal remains. On 5 November 2001, UNMIK signed the UNMIK-FRY Common Document reiterating, among other things, its commitment to solving the fate of missing persons from all communities, and recognizing that the exhumation and identification programme is only a part of the activities related to missing persons. As of June 2002, the newly established Office on Missing Persons and Forensics (OMPF) in the UNMIK Department of Justice (DOJ) became the sole authority mandated to determine the whereabouts of missing persons, identify their mortal remains and return them to the family of the missing. Starting from 2001, based on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between UNMIK and the Sarajevo-based International Commission of Missing Persons (ICMP), supplemented by a further agreement in 2003, the identification of mortal remains was carried out by the ICMP through DNA testing.
23. On 9 December 2008, UNMIK’s responsibility with regard to police and justice in Kosovo ended with EULEX assuming full operational control in the area of the rule of law, following the Statement made by the President of the United Nations Security Council on 26 November 2008 (S/PRST/2008/44), welcoming the continued engagement of the European Union in Kosovo.
24. On the same date, UNMIK and EULEX signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the modalities, and the respective rights and obligations arising from the transfer from UNMIK to EULEX of cases and the related files which involved on-going investigations, prosecutions and other activities undertaken by UNMIK international prosecutors. Shortly thereafter, similar agreements were signed with regard to the files handled by international judges and UNMIK Police. All agreements obliged EULEX to provide to UNMIK access to the documents related to the actions previously undertaken by UNMIK authorities. Between 9 December 2008 and 30 March 2009, all criminal case files held by the UNMIK DOJ and UNMIK Police were supposed to be handed over to EULEX.
25. **Circumstances surrounding the abduction and disappearance of Mr Lj. B.**
26. The complainant is the wife of Mr Lj. B.
27. The complainant states that her husband was abducted on 22 June 1999 in Prishtinë/Priština by KLA members. She further states she was informed by a witness that he was taken to the KFOR military base “Bondsteel”. Since that time her husband’s whereabouts have remained unknown.
28. The complainant states that the disappearance was reported to the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP), the ICRC, KFOR and UNMIK. The complainant also states that the matter was reported to the International District Public Prosecutor’s Office (DPPO) in Prishtinё/Priština, but presents no specific details.
29. In her submissions to the Panel, the latest dating back to 6 April 2009, the complainant states that she had not received any information from the authorities on the fate of her husband.
30. The ICRC tracing request for Mr Lj. B. remains open[[3]](#footnote-3). His name also appears in the list of missing persons, which was forwarded by the ICRC to UNMIK on 12 October 2001, for whom the ICRC had collected ante-mortem data in Serbia proper, between 1 July and 20 September 2001. Likewise, his name is in the database compiled by the UNMIK OMPF[[4]](#footnote-4). The entry in relation to Mr Lj. B. in the online database maintained by the ICMP[[5]](#footnote-5) reads in relevant fields: “Sufficient Reference Samples Collected” and “DNA match not found.” An ICRC tracing request for Mr Lj. B. remains open.
31. **The investigation**

*Disclosure of relevant files*

1. In the present case, the Panel received from UNMIK copies of documents which were previously held by the UNMIK OMPF and UNMIK Police WCIU. The Panel notes that UNMIK has confirmed that all documents available to it have been provided.
2. Concerning disclosure of the information contained in the files, the Panel recalls that UNMIK has made available investigative files for the Panel’s review under a pledge of confidentiality. In this regard, the Panel must clarify that, although its assessment of the present case stems from a thorough examination of the available documentation, only limited information contained therein is disclosed. Hence a synopsis of relevant investigative steps taken by investigative authorities is provided in the paragraphs to follow.

*The Investigative File*

1. The earliest dated document in the OMPF file is a copy of a signed statement by the complainant to the Serbian MUP, dated 24 November 1999, with a hand written file no. 1999-000053 on top. The letter provides details of the kidnapping of Mr Lj. B. on 22 June 1999. The letter states that Mr Lj. B was kidnapped by KLA members and gives the name of an eye witness as well as the name of the person who kidnapped him. Moreover, the letter goes on to describe that the witness stated that the named kidnapper had held Mr Lj. B. for two days before handing him “over to KFOR members respectively American members.” The letter states that Mr Lj. B. was kidnapped by KLA members and transferred to camp Bondsteel and that after a month he attempted to escape with 20 persons kept there “but was killed in the vicinity of Medvedje.”
2. The next document in the file is a letter from the Republic of Serbia MUP to UNMIK Police, dated 30 November 1999. The letter gives a brief description of the kidnapping of Mr. Lj. B. and requests that intensive measures are undertaken to search for him. The statement mentioned in § 31 above from Mr. Lj. B.’s wife was attached.
3. The file also contains an MPU Case Continuation Report concerning Mr Lj. B. affixed with MPU case file no. 1999-000053. The Report has 4 entries, the first two dated 15 February 2000, states “1. Letter for MUP says attached statement of MP’s wife is translated – no translation received here. 2. “Sent copy of stat. to CCIU for translation.” The next entry, dated 16 February 2000 states “3. Rec’d translated stmt see p.5”. The final entry dated 17 January 2002 states: “DVI – input okay– ok”. Also in the file is the printout of a Victim Identification Form for Mr Lj. B. ostensibly drafted in 1999. Besides containing his ante-mortem information forwarded by the ICRC, the Form provides the full addresses and telephone numbers in Serbia proper of Mr Lj. B.’s sister, mother and spouse respectively. It also provides details of his kidnapping.
4. The file contains a File Diary Date Register with file number 1999-000053 containing two entries; the first dated 28 February 2000 stating “Translation – OSCE+ICRC checks” and the second dated 15 March 2000 stating “Response [unidentifiable mark] KFOR”.
5. The file also contains an Investigational Checklist for file no. 1999-000053, with instructions reading “use to log action requests and responses - do not put away until all responses received”. The names of three agencies are included with request and response dates. For KFOR there is a request date of 25 February 2000 and no response date. For the OSCE there is a request date of 15 February 2000 and no response date. For the ICRC there is a request date of 15 February 2000 and a response date of 25 February 2000”.
6. Among the documents in the file is a copy of an Action Request from the Chief of the UNMIK MPU to the Joint Implementation Commission (JIC) in KFOR main, dated 25 February 2000. The subject of the request was “Mr. [Lj. B.] Missing Person” and the request provided copies of correspondence received from FRY authorities regarding his disappearance. Moreover, the Action Request states “According to the complainant [Mr. Lj. B.] was held at Camp Bondsteel by US KFOR and was subsequently killed in the vicinity of Medvedje after escaping from that facility. It is requested that the veracity of the information be determined and reported to MPU. It is further requested that, in the event that the information is incorrect, any details of KFOR contact with this individual be reported to MPU.” Another letter is included in the file dated 1 July 2004 by an UNMIK investigator to the KFOR Commander at Camp Bondsteel. The letter refers to the earlier letter of 25 February 2000, reiterating the information of Mr Lj. B. reportedly being transferred to Camp Bondsteel and requesting information. Both the JIC in KFOR Main and the MUP of Serbia are listed as having been copied to in the letter. There is no response to either letter in the file.
7. The investigative file further contains a WCIU “Anti-Mortem Investigation Report” affixed with MPU case file no. 1999-000053 and dated 15 March 2005. The Report states that Mr Lj. B was reported missing since 22/06/1999 and on this date “was kidnapped on his way home in Pristina...” The report further states that “Allegedly KLA members kidnapped him…while he was going on foot back home from the work.” The report summarised the statement of Mr Lj. B’s wife that “Witness of this kidnapping was Albanian neighbour named [NA] who saw that 2 KLA members took [Mr Lj. B] to unknown direction. She stated that [FS] ex worker of MIA of Yugoslavia organized this kidnapping and kept her husband for two days. Afterwards allegedly he was transferred to American KFOR base “Bond steel” in Klokot Banja and kept where (sic) with other 20 persons for 1 month. Then these people tried to escape they were shot dead in the vicinity of Medvedje. It was last information about a fate of MP. On 01/07/2004 MPU investigator [KK] sent a request to the Commander of American camp “Bond steel” to check the above mentioned allegations, but we have received any reply yet. We tried to identify and locate possible witness named [NA] and possible suspect named [FS], but we haven’t found any relative records at available database.” The Report further states that the abduction was first recorded by the ICRC in Belgrade under no. BLG8002605-01 and that the UNMIK MPU had opened a missing person file on the matter on 30 November 1999. In the field “Conclusion” the report states: “There is no information leading to a possible MP’s location. It could be useful to contact with officials from Ministry of Interior of SCG in the matter to collect more data about possible suspect [FS]. This case should remain open inactive within the WCU.”

1. Included in the file is an MPU report with a printout date of 11 March 2005 with file no. 1999-000053 listing the physical description of Mr Lj. B. and a modus stating “MP was kidnapped on his way home, probably in Jablanicka street. Letter of his wife in Serbian.”
2. The latest document in the file titled “Investigation Details for Investigation Number: 0347/INV/04” printed on 16 March 2005 indicating file no. 1999-000035 and containing the name of Mr Lj. B. The investigators’ notes to the file read; “Refer to the investigation report and MPU file, this case should be kept inactive.”
3. **THE COMPLAINT**
4. The complainant complains about UNMIK’s alleged failure to properly investigate the abduction and disappearance of Mr Lj. B. In this regard the Panel deems that the complainant invokes a violation of the procedural limb of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
5. The complainant also complains about the mental pain and suffering allegedly caused to her by this situation. In this regard, she relies on Article 3 of the ECHR.
6. **THE LAW**
7. **Alleged violation of the procedural obligation under Article 2 of the ECHR**
	1. **The scope of the Panel’s review**
8. In determining whether it considers that there has been a violation of Article 2 (procedural limb) of the ECHR, the Panel is mindful of the existing case-law, notably that of the European Court of Human Rights. However, the Panel is also aware that the complaints before it differ in some significant ways from those brought before that Court. First, the respondent is not a State but an interim international territorial administration mandated to exercise temporary responsibilities in Kosovo. No suspicion attaches to UNMIK with respect to the substantive obligations under Article 2 of the ECHR. Second, as in a limited number of cases before the European Court, those suspected of being responsible for the alleged killings and/or abductions are in all cases before the Panel non-state actors, mostly but not exclusively connected to the conflict. These are factors for the Panel to take into consideration as it assesses for the first time the procedural positive obligations of an intergovernmental organisation with respect to acts committed by third parties in a territory over which it has temporary legislative, executive and judicial control.
9. Before turning to the examination of the merits of the complaints, the Panel needs to clarify the scope of its review.
10. The Panel notes that with the adoption of the UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/1 on 25 July 1999 UNMIK undertook an obligation to observe internationally recognised human rights standards in exercising its functions. This undertaking was detailed in UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/24 of 12 December 1999, by which UNMIK assumed obligations under the following human rights instruments: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and Protocols thereto, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, [the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment](http://untreaty.un.org/English/TreatyEvent2001/pdf/07e.pdf), the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
11. The Panel also notes that Section 1.2 of UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/12 of 23 March 2006 on the Establishment of the Human Rights Advisory Panel provides that the Panel “shall examine complaints from any person or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by UNMIK of (their) human rights”. It follows that only acts or omissions attributable to UNMIK fall within the jurisdiction *ratione personae* of the Panel. In this respect, it should be noted, as stated above, that as of 9 December 2008, UNMIK no longer exercises executive authority over the Kosovo judiciary and law enforcement machinery. Therefore UNMIK bears no responsibility for any violation of human rights allegedly committed by those bodies. Insofar as the complainants complain about acts that occurred after that date, they fall outside the jurisdiction *ratione personae* of the Panel.
12. Likewise, the Panel emphasises that, as far as its jurisdiction *ratione materiae* is concerned, as follows from Section 1.2 of UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/12, it can only examine complaints relating to an alleged violation of human rights. This means that it can only review acts or omissions complained of for their compatibility with the international human rights instruments referred to above (see § 42). In the particular case of killings and disappearances in life-threatening circumstances, it is not the Panel’s role to replace the competent authorities in the investigation of the case. Its task is limited to examining the effectiveness of the criminal investigation into such killings and disappearances, in the light of the procedural obligations flowing from Article 2 of the ECHR.
13. The Panel further notes that Section 2 of UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/12 provides that the Panel shall have jurisdiction over complaints relating to alleged violations of human rights “that had occurred not earlier than 23 April 2005 or arising from facts which occurred prior to this date where these facts give rise to a continuing violation of human rights”. It follows that events that took place before 23 April 2005 generally fall outside the jurisdiction *ratione temporis* of the Panel. However, to the extent that such events gave rise to a continuing situation, the Panel has jurisdiction to examine complaints relating to that situation (see European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Grand Chamber [GC], *Varnava and Others v. Turkey*, nos 16064/90 and others, judgment of 18 September 2009, §§ 147-149; ECtHR, *Cyprus v. Turkey* [GC] no. 25781/94, judgment of 10 May 2001, § 136, ECHR 2001-IV).
	1. **The parties’ submissions**
14. The complainant in substance alleges violations concerning the lack of an adequate criminal investigation into the abduction and disappearance of Mr Lj. B. The complainant also states that she was not informed as to whether an investigation was conducted and what the outcome was.
15. The SRSG generally accepts that Lj. B.’s abduction and disappearance occurred in life threatening circumstances. The SRSG states that Mr Lj. B. disappeared on 22 June 1999, a few days after the arrival of KFOR and UNMIK in Kosovo and that the security situation at that time was “tense, with a number of serious criminal incidents targeting Kosovo-Serbians and Kosovo-Albanians, including abductions and killings”. Citing the UN Secretary-General’s report to the United Nations Security Council of 12 June 1999, the SRSG describes the situation as follows:

“The general situation in Kosovo has been tense but is stabilizing. The KLA has rapidly moved back into all parts of Kosovo, in particular the south-west, and a large number of Kosovo Serbs have left their homes for Serbia. While the first wave of Kosovo Serb departures was prompted by security concerns rather than by actual threats, a second wave of departures resulted from an increasing number of incidents committed by Kosovo Albanians against Kosovo Serbs. In particular, high profile killings and abductions, as well as looting, arsons and forced expropriation of apartments, have prompted departures. This process has now slowed down, but such cities as Prizren and Pec are practically deserted by Kosovo Serbs, and the towns of Mitrovica and Orahovac are divided along ethnic lines.

The security problem in Kosovo is largely a result of the absence of law and order institutions and agencies. Many crimes and injustices cannot be properly pursued. Criminal gangs competing for control over scarce resources are already exploiting this void. While KFOR is currently responsible for maintaining public safety and civil law and order, its ability to do so is limited due to the fact that it is still in the process of building up its forces. The absence of a legitimate police force, both international and local, is deeply felt, and therefore will have to be addressed as a matter of priority.”

1. Accepting that Mr Lj. B. disappeared in life-threatening circumstances, the SRSG does not dispute UNMIK’s responsibility to conduct an investigation into his abduction under Article 2 of the ECHR, procedural part. In the words of the SRSG, “the essential purpose of such investigation [was] to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life, as defined by UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/1 On the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo of 25 July 1999 and subsequently, by UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/24 On the Law Applicable in Kosovo of 12 December 1999, as amended.”
2. The SRSG underlines that the complainant does not allege a violation of the substantive part of Article 2, but rather of its procedural element. The SRSG states that “the procedural element of Article 2 is essentially two-fold: (i) an obligation to determine through investigation the fate and/or whereabouts of the missing person; and (ii) an obligation to conduct an investigation capable of determining whether the death was caused unlawfully and leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible for the disappearance and/or death of the missing person.”
3. The SRSG further observes that when determining applications under Article 2, procedural part, consideration must be given to not imposing an impossible or disproportionate burden on UNMIK. In this regard, the SRSG recalls the judgment of 15 February 2011 rendered by the European Court of Human Rights in the case *Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina*, stating at paragraph 70:

“The Court takes into account the complex situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, notably in the first ten years following the war. In such a post-conflict situation, what amounts to an impossible and/or disproportionate burden must be measured by the very particular facts and context. In this connection, the Court notes that more than 100,000 people were killed, almost 30,000 people went missing and more than two million people were displaced during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Inevitably choices had to be made in terms of post-war priorities and resources. Furthermore, after a long and brutal war, Bosnia and Herzegovina underwent fundamental overhaul of its internal structure and political system: Entities and Cantons were set up pursuant to the Dayton Peace Agreement, power-sharing arrangements were introduced in order to ensure effective equality between the “constituent peoples” in the post-conflict society (see *Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia Herzegovina* [GC], nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06, ECHR 2009-…), new institutions had to be created and the existing ones had to be restructured. Some reluctance on the part of the former warring parties to work with those new institutions could be expected in the post-war period, as evidenced in the present case. While it is difficult to pinpoint when exactly this process ended, the Court considers that the domestic legal system should have become capable of dealing effectively with disappearances and other serious violations of international humanitarian law by 2005, following comprehensive vetting of the appointment of police and judiciary and the establishment of the War Crimes Sections within the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. All this considered and since there has been no substantial period of inactivity post-2005 on the part of the domestic authorities in the present case, the Court concludes that, in the circumstances obtaining at the material time, the domestic criminal investigation can be considered to have been conducted with reasonable promptness and expedition.”

1. In the view of the SRSG, UNMIK faced a very similar situation in Kosovo “from 1999 to 2008” as the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1995.
2. The SRSG states that during the Kosovo conflict thousands of people went missing, at least 800,000 people were displaced and thousands were killed. Many of the persons who went missing were abducted, killed, and buried in unmarked graves inside or outside Kosovo, which made very difficult locating and recovering their mortal remains.
3. In June 2002, UNMIK created the OMPF with the mandate to determine the fate of the missing; however its work was faced with many challenges at the beginning of its operations, due to the work previously done mostly by actors independent from UNMIK. In particular, the SRSG states that the collection of evidence of war crimes began with the arrival of NATO in 1999 with independent teams from several countries operating under the loose coordination of the ICTY. A lack of standard operating procedures or centralisation led to problems with the evidence gathered in this phase. In 2000, ICTY launched a large, centralised forensic operation, based at the Rahovec/Orahovac mortuary, with standard operating procedures for all forensic teams except the British one, which operated independently out of Prishtinë/Priština. The SRSG states that, in the effort to demonstrate that crimes were systematic and widespread, the ICTY teams conducted autopsies on as many bodies as possible, carrying out little or no identification work; moreover, unidentified bodies exhumed in 1999 were reburied in locations still unknown to the OMPF. After the ICTY closed their operation in 2000, the UNMIK Police MPU continued small-scale investigations on missing persons “*ex-officio*, without any broader prosecutorial strategy”. As a consequence, a large amount of unstructured information was collected.
4. The SRSG states that locating and identifying the missing in the context described above is a very difficult and time-consuming task. He further states that the number of missing persons recovered and identified by OMPF is “testament to the vigour of its work between 2002-2008” and that “more bodies continued to be located in burial sites and more identifications and returns to family members are taking place, often based on information contained in UNMIK-OMPF files”. The SRSG continues that “therefore, it is apparent that the process for establishing a system capable of dealing effectively with disappearances and other serious violations of international humanitarian law has been an understandably incremental one” in Kosovo as reflected in the *Palić* case referred to above. The SRSG further notes that this process was “reliant on a number of actors rather than just UNMIK, for example the International Commission on Missing Persons, the International Committee of the Red Cross and local missing person’s organisations.”
5. The SRSG further argues that fundamental to conducting effective investigations is a professional, well trained and well-resourced police force and that such a force did not exist in Kosovo in the aftermath of the conflict. In the policing vacuum following the end of the conflict, UNMIK had to build a new Kosovo Police Service from scratch, a long and challenging task, which, according to the SRSG, is still in progress. The SRSG also states that UNMIK Police faced numerous challenges in exercising law enforcement functions gradually transferred to it by KFOR in 1999-2000. In this regard, he refers to the UNMIK Police Annual Report of 2000 describing the situation as follows:

“UNMIK Police had to deal with in the aftermath of war, with dead bodies and the looted and burned houses. Ethnic violence flared through illegal evictions, forcible takeovers of properties, the burning of houses and physical violence against communities all over Kosovo. Tempers and tensions were running high amongst all ethnic groups, exacerbated by reports of missing and dead persons. It became imperative for UNMIK Police to establish order and to quickly construct a framework to register and investigate crimes.

All of this had to be done with limited physical and human resources. Being the first executive mission in the history of the UN, the concept, planning and implementation was being developed on the ground. With 20 different contributory nationalities at the beginning, it was a very challenging task for police managers to establish common practices for optimum results in a high-risk environment.”

1. The SRSG states that UNMIK Police WCIU included both international UNMIK Police and local Kosovo Police Service officers and focused on the criminal investigation of cases of missing persons. Their responsibility included locating illicit graves, identifying the perpetrators and collecting evidence relating to crimes. UNMIK international police officers working on cases of missing persons had to adjust to conducting investigations in a foreign territory and cultures, with limited support from the still developing Kosovo Police.
2. He further states that, after the conflict, all local institutions in Kosovo, including law-enforcement institutions and those responsible for locating the missing, were non-functional and had to be established from scratch. In addition, investigators were often faced with situations where individuals holding relevant knowledge on the whereabouts and fate of missing persons did not want to disclose this information. According to the SRSG, all these constraints inhibited the ability of the UNMIK Police to conduct investigations according to the standards that may be expected from States “with more established institutions and without going through the difficulties associated with a post-conflict situation.”
3. With regard to the complaint of Mrs Z.B. under Article 2 of the ECHR, the SRSG lists the actions undertaken by UNMIK authorities. He states that on 30 November 1999 UNMIK Police MPU opened a file under the name of Mr Lj. B. Furthermore, he refers to two instances where UNMIK MPU sent memoranda to KFOR in 2000 and 2004 respectively regarding the alleged detention in camp Bondsteel and for any information that KFOR may hold with respect to the allegations made by the complainant. The SRSG states that “Even though the Memorandum does not expressly say so, its language supports the presumption that no reply communication had meanwhile been received from KFOR.” A report of the UNMIK Police WCIU dated 15 March 2005 states that the case should be left inactive.
4. The SRSG argues that “The file transmitted by EULEX indicates that UNMIK complied with its obligation to open an investigation into the case of Mr. Lj. B and that the investigation was pursued and reviewed in 2002, 2004 and 2005 by UNMIK police. The efforts by UNMIK’s police to follow up on the investigative leads provided by the Complainant were unfortunately unsuccessful.” The SRSG notes that “in other missing persons’ cases that, without witnesses coming forward or physical evidence being discovered, police investigations inevitably stall because of a lack of evidence.”
5. The SRSG submits that UNMIK did conduct an investigation in accordance with Article 2. Nonetheless, he states that “as there is the possibility that additional and conclusive information exists, beyond the documents mentioned above, UNMIK reserves its right to make further comments on this matter”.
	1. **The Panel’s assessment**
6. The Panel considers that the complainant invokes a violation of the procedural obligation stemming from the right to life, guaranteed by Article 2 of the ECHR in that UNMIK Police did not conduct an effective investigation into the abduction and disappearance of Mr Lj. B.
7. *Submission of relevant files*
8. The SRSG observes that all available files regarding the investigation have been presented to the Panel, but he suggests that further documentation might exist which is not included in the abovementioned files (see § 58 above). On 6 November 2014, UNMIK confirmed to the Panel that the disclosure may be considered complete (see § 9 above).
9. The Panel notes that Section 15 of UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/12 states that the Panel may request the submission from UNMIK of any documents and that the SRSG shall cooperate with the Panel and provide the necessary assistance including, in particular, in the release of documents and information relevant to the complaints. The Panel in this regard refers to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights that inferences shall be drawn from the conduct of the respondent party during the proceedings, including from its failure “to submit information in their hands without a satisfactory explanation” (see ECtHR, *Çelikbilek v. Turkey*, no. 27693/95, judgment of 31 May 2005*,* § 56).
10. The Panel also notes that the proper maintenance of investigative files concerning crimes such as killings and disappearances, from the opening of the investigation to their handing over, is crucial to the continuation of such investigations and could thus raise *per se* issues under Article 2 (see Human Rights Advisory Panel [HRAP], *Bulatović*, no. 166/09, opinion of 13 November 2014, § 62). The Panel has no reason to doubt that UNMIK undertook all efforts in order to obtain the relevant investigative files. However, the Panel likewise notes that UNMIK has not provided any further explanation as to whether or not any additional documentation may exist, nor with respect to which parts of the investigation.
11. The Panel itself is not in the position to verify the completeness of the investigative files received. The Panel will therefore assess the merits of the complaints on the basis of documents made available (in this sense, see ECtHR, *Tsechoyev v. Russia*, no. 39358/05, judgment of 15 March 2011, § 146).
12. *General principles concerning the obligation to conduct an effective investigation under Article 2*

1. The Panel notes that the positive obligation to investigate disappearances is widely accepted in international human rights law since at least the case of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights *Velásquez-Rodríguez* (see Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), *Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras*, judgment of 29 July 1988, Series C No. 4). The positive obligation has also been stated by the HRC as stemming from Article 6 (right to life), Article 7 (prohibition of cruel and inhuman treatment) and Article 9 (right to liberty and security of person), read in conjunction with Article 2(3) (right to an effective remedy) of the ICCPR(see HRC, General Comment No. 6, 30 April 1982, § 4; HRC, General Comment No. 31, 26 May 2004, §§ 8 and 18, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13; see also, among others, HRC, *Mohamed El Awani, v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya*, communication no. 1295/2004, views of 11 July 2007, CCPR/C/90/D/1295/2004). The obligation to investigate disappearances and killings is also asserted in the UN Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearances (A/Res/47/133, 18 December 1992), and further detailed in UN guidelines such as the UN Manual on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal Arbitrary and Summary Executions (1991) and the “Guidelines for the Conduct of United Nations Inquiries into Allegations of Massacres” (1995). The importance of the obligation is confirmed by the adoption of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance in 2006, which entered into force on 23 December 2010.
2. In order to address the complainants’ allegations, the Panel refers, in particular, to the well-established case-law of the European Court on Human Rights on the procedural obligation under Article 2 of the ECHR. The Court has held that “[The] obligation to protect the right to life under Article 2 of the Convention, read in conjunction with the State's general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention”, requires by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed (see, *mutatis mutandis*, ECtHR, *McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom*, judgment of 27 September 1995, § 161, Series A no. 324; and ECtHR, *Kaya v. Turkey*, judgment of 19 February 1998, § 105, *Reports of Judgments and Decisions* 1998-I; see also ECtHR, *Jasinskis v. Latvia*, no. 45744/08, judgment of 21 December 2010, § 71). The duty to conduct such an investigation arises in all cases of killing and other suspicious death, whether the perpetrators were private persons or State agents or are unknown (see ECtHR, *Kolevi v. Bulgaria*, no. 1108/02, judgment of 5 November 2009, § 191).
3. The European Court has also stated that the procedural obligation to provide some form of effective official investigation exists also when an individual has gone missing in life-threatening circumstances and is not confined to cases where it is apparent that the disappearance was caused by an agent of the State (see ECtHR [GC], *Varnava and Others v. Turkey*, cited in § 45 above, at § 136; ECtHR [GC], *Mocanu and Others v. Romania*, nos 10865/09, 45886/07 and 32431/08, judgment of 17 September 2014, § 317).
4. The authorities must act of their own motion once the matter has come to their attention, and they cannot leave it to the initiative of the next-of-kin either to lodge a formal complaint or to take responsibility for the conduct of any investigative procedure (see ECtHR, *Ahmet Özkan and Others v. Turkey*, no. 21689/93, judgment of 6 April 2004, § 310; see also ECtHR, *Isayeva v. Russia*, no. 57950/00, judgment of 24 February 2005, § 210; ECtHR [GC], *Mocanu and Others v. Romania*, cited above, § 321).
5. Setting out the standards of an effective investigation, the Court has stated that besides being independent, accessible to the victim’s family, carried out with reasonable promptness and expedition, affording a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation and its results, the investigation must also be effective in the sense that is capable of leading to a determination of whether the death was caused unlawfully and if so, to the identification and punishment of those responsible (see ECtHR [GC]*, Varnava and Others v. Turkey*, cited in § 43 above, at § 191; see also ECtHR, *Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina*, no. 4704/04, judgment of 15 February 2011, § 63). This is not an obligation of results but of means. The authorities must take whatever reasonable steps they can to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia eye-witness testimony, forensic evidence and, where appropriate, an autopsy which provides a complete and accurate record of injury and an objective analysis of the clinical findings, including the cause of death. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of death or the person or persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (see ECtHR, *Ahmet Özkan and Others v. Turkey*, cited above, at § 312; and *Isayeva v. Russia*, cited above, at § 212).
6. In particular, the investigation’s conclusion must be based on thorough, objective and impartial analysis of all relevant elements. Failing to follow an obvious line of enquiry undermines to a decisive extent the investigation’s ability to establish the circumstances of the case and the identity of those responsible (see ECtHR, *Kolevi v. Bulgaria*, cited in § 67 above, at § 201). Nevertheless, the nature and degree of scrutiny which satisfy the minimum threshold of the investigation’s effectiveness depend on the circumstances of the particular case. They must be assessed on the basis of all relevant facts and with regard to the practical realities of the investigation work (see ECtHR, *Velcea and Mazăre v. Romania*, no. 64301/01, judgment of 1 December 2009, § 105). At the same time, the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation (see ECtHR [GC], *El-Masri v. “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”*, no. 39630/09, judgment of 13 December 2012, § 183; ECtHR [GC], *Mocanu and Others v. Romania*, cited in § 68 above, at § 322).
7. A requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in this context. Even where there may be obstacles or difficulties which prevent progress in an investigation in a particular situation, a prompt response by the authorities is vital in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts (see ECtHR, *Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom*, no. 46477/99, judgment of 14 March 2002, § 72, ECHR 2002‑II; ECtHR [GC], *Mocanu and Others v. Romania*, cited in § 68 above, at § 323).
8. Specifically with regard to persons disappeared and later found dead, which is not the situation in the present case, the Court has stated that the procedures of exhuming and identifying mortal remains do not exhaust the obligation under Article 2 of the ECHR. The Court holds that “the procedural obligation arising from a disappearance will generally remain as long as the whereabouts and fate of the person are unaccounted for, and it is thus of a continuing nature” (ECtHR, *Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina*, cited in § 68 above, at § 46; in the same sense ECtHR [GC], *Varnava and Others v. Turkey*, cited in § 43 above, at § 148, *Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia*, nos 2944/06 and others, judgment of 18 December 2012, § 122). However, the Court also stresses that this procedural obligation “does not come to an end even on discovery of the body .... This only casts light on one aspect of the fate of the missing person and the obligation to account for the disappearance and death, as well as to identify and prosecute any perpetrator of unlawful acts in that connection, will generally remain” (ECtHR, *Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina*, cited above, at § 46; in the same sense ECtHR [GC], *Varnava and Others v. Turkey*, cited in § 43 above, at § 145). While the location and the subsequent identification of the mortal remains of the victim may in themselves be significant achievements, the procedural obligation under Article 2 continues to exist (see ECtHR, *Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina*, cited in § 70 above, at § 64).
9. On the requirement of public scrutiny, the Court has further stated that there must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory. The degree of public scrutiny required may well vary from case to case. In all cases, however, the victim's next-of-kin must be involved in the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests (see *Ahmet Özkan and Others v. Turkey*, cited in § 67 above, at §§ 311‑314; *Isayeva v. Russia*, cited in 67 above, §§ 211-214 and the cases cited therein).” ECtHR [GC], *Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom*, no. 55721/07, judgment of 7 July 2011, § 167, ECHR 2011; ECtHR [GC], *Mocanu and Others v. Romania*, cited in § 66 above, at § 324).
10. The Court has also underlined the great importance of an effective investigation in establishing the truth of what transpired thereby satisfying the right to truth not only for the families of victims, but also for other victims of similar crimes, as well as the general public, who have the right to know what occurred (ECtHR [GC], *El-Masri v. “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”*, cited in § 69 above, at § 191; ECtHR, *Al Nashiri v. Poland*, no. 28761/11, judgment of 24 July 2014, §§ 495-496). United Nations bodies also recognise the importance of the right to truth. In the words of the United Nations Secretary-General, “the right to truth implies knowing the full and complete truth about the violations and the events that transpired, their specific circumstances and who participated in them. In the case of missing persons … it also implies the right to know the fate and whereabouts of the victim” (see Report of the UN Secretary-General, Missing Persons, UN Document A/67/267, 8 August 2012, § 5;see also HRC,  *Schedko and Bondarenko v. Belarus*, Communication no. 886/1999, views of 3 April 2003, § 10.2, CCPR/C/77/D/886/1999; HRC, *Mariam, Philippe, Auguste and Thomas Sankara v. Burkina Faso*, Communication no. 1159/2003, views of 8 March 2006, § 10.2, CCPR/C/86/D/1159/2003; UN Human Rights Council, Resolutions 9/11 and 12/12: Right to the Truth, 24 September 2008 and 12 October 2009; Preamble and Article 24 (2) of the Convention for the Protection of All People from Enforced Disappearance, cited in § 106 above; see also Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Mr Ben Emmerson, *Framework Principles for securing the accountability of public officials for gross and systematic human rights violations committed in the context of State counter-terrorist initiatives*, UN Document A/HRC/22/52, 1 March 2013, § 23 - 26).
11. *Applicability of Article 2 to the Kosovo context*
12. The Panel is conscious of the fact that the abduction and disappearance of Mr Lj. B. took place shortly after the deployment of UNMIK in Kosovo in the aftermath of the armed conflict, when crime, violence and insecurity were rife.
13. On his part, the SRSG does not contest that UNMIK had a duty to investigate the present case under ECHR Article 2. However, according to the SRSG, the unique circumstances pertaining to the Kosovo context and to UNMIK’s deployment in the first phase of its mission shall be taken into account when assessing whether this investigation is in compliance with Article 2 of the ECHR. In substance, the SRSG argues that it is not possible to apply to UNMIK the same standards applicable to a State in a normal situation.
14. The Panel considers that the SRSG’s arguments raise two main questions: first, whether the standards of Article 2 continue to apply in situation of conflict or generalised violence and, secondly, whether such standards shall be considered fully applicable to UNMIK.
15. As regards the applicability of Article 2 to UNMIK, the Panel recalls that with the adoption of the UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/1 on 25 July 1999 UNMIK undertook an obligation to observe internationally recognised human rights standards in exercising its functions. This undertaking was detailed in UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/24 of 12 December 1999, by which UNMIK assumed obligations under certain international human rights instruments, including the ECHR. In this respect, the Panel has already found that it is true that UNMIK’s interim character and related difficulties must be duly taken into account with regard to a number of situations, but under no circumstances could these elements be taken as a justification for diminishing standards of respect for human rights, which were duly incorporated into UNMIK’s mandate (see HRAP, *Milogorić and Others,* nos 38/08 and others, opinion of 24 March 2011, § 44; *Berisha and Others,* nos 27/08 and others, opinion of 23 February 2011,§ 25; *Lalić and Others*, nos 09/08 and others, opinion of 9 June 2012, § 22).
16. Concerning the applicability of Article 2 to situations of conflict or generalised violence, the Panel recalls that the European Court on Human Rights has established the applicability of Article 2 to post-conflict situations, including in countries of the former Yugoslavia (see, among other examples, ECtHR, *Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina,* cited in § 70 above, and ECtHR, *Jularić v. Croatia*, no. 20106/06, judgment of 20 January 2011). The Court has further held that that the procedural obligation under Article 2 continues to apply in “difficult security conditions, including in a context of armed conflict” (see ECtHR [GC], *Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom*, cited in § 72 above, at § 164; see also ECtHR, *Güleç v. Turkey*, judgment of 27 July 1998, § 81, Reports 1998-IV; ECtHR, *Ergi v. Turkey*, judgment of 28 July 1998 , §§ 79 and 82, Reports 1998-IV; ECtHR, *Ahmet Özkan and Others v. Turkey*, cited in § 69 above, at §§ 85-90, 309-320 and 326-330; *Isayeva v. Russia*, cited in § 69 above, at §§ 180 and 210; ECtHR, *Kanlibaş v. Turkey*, no. 32444/96, judgment of 8 December 2005, §§ 39-51).
17. The Court has acknowledged that “where the death [and disappearances] to be investigated under Article 2 occur in circumstances of generalised violence, armed conflict or insurgency, obstacles may be placed in the way of investigators and concrete constraints may compel the use of less effective measures of investigation or may cause an investigation to be delayed” (see, ECtHR [GC], *Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom,* cited above, at § 164; ECtHR, *Bazorkina v. Russia*, no. 69481/01, judgment of 27 July 2006, § 121). Nonetheless, the Court has held that “the obligation under Article 2 to safeguard life entails that, even in difficult security conditions, all reasonable steps must be taken to ensure that an effective, independent investigation is conducted into alleged breaches of the right to life (see, amongst many other examples, ECtHR, *Kaya v. Turkey*, cited in § 67 above, at §§ 86‑92; ECtHR, *Ergi v Turkey,* cited above, at §§ 82-85; ECtHR [GC], *Tanrıkulu v. Turkey*, no. 23763/94, judgment of 8 July 1999, §§ 101-110, ECHR 1999-IV; ECtHR, *Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia*, nos 57942/00 and 57945/00, judgment of 24 February 2005, §§ 156-166; ECtHR, *Isayeva v. Russia*, cited in § 69 above, at §§ 215‑224; ECtHR, *Musayev and Others v. Russia*, nos 57941/00 and others, judgment of 26 July 2007, §§ 158-165).
18. Similarly, the HRC has held that the right to life, including its procedural guarantees, shall be considered as the supreme right from which no derogation is permitted even in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation (see, HRC, General Comment No. 6, cited in § 66 above, at § 1; HRC, *Abubakar Amirov and Aïzan Amirova v. Russian Federation*, communication no. 1447/2006, views of 22 April 2009, § 11.2, CCPR/C/95/D/1447/2006). Further, the HRC has stated the applicability of Article 2 (3), 6 and 7 of the ICCPR with specific reference to UNMIK’s obligation to conduct proper investigations on disappearances and abductions in Kosovo (see HRC, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Kosovo (Serbia), 14 August 2006, §§ 12-13, CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1).
19. The Panel appreciates the difficulties encountered by UNMIK during the first phase of its deployment. The Panel notes that the appropriate importance attached to the issue of missing persons in Kosovo meant that UNMIK had to take into account both the humanitarian and criminal dimensions of the situation. In particular, the Panel considers that the importance attached to the criminal investigations and the difficulties in Kosovo that limited the abilities of investigating authorities to conduct such investigations, made it crucial that UNMIK establish from the outset an environment conducive to the performance of meaningful investigations. This would involve putting in place a system that would include such elements as the allocation of overall responsibility for the supervision and monitoring of progress in investigations, provision for the regular review of the status of investigations, and a process for the proper handover of cases between different officers or units of UNMIK Police. Such a system should also take account of the protection needs of victims and witnesses (see, *mutatis mutandis*, ECtHR, *R.R. and Others v. Hungary*, no. 19400/11, judgment of 4 December 2012, §§ 28-32), as well as to consider the special vulnerability of displaced persons in post-conflict situations (see ECtHR [GC], *Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan,* no. 40167/06, decision of 14 December 2011, § 145; and ECtHR [GC], *Chiragov and Others v. Armenia*, no. 13216/05, decision of 14 December 2011, § 146). While understanding that the deployment and the organisation of the police and justice apparatus occurred gradually, the Panel deems that this process was completed in 2003 when the police and justice system in Kosovo was described as being “well-functioning” and “sustainable” by the UN Secretary-General (see § 18 above).
20. In response to the SRSG’s objection that Article 2 must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities, either in the context of policing activities or that of priorities and resources, the Panel takes into account that the European Court has established that what amounts to an impossible and/or disproportionate burden must be measured by the very particular facts and contexts (see ECtHR, *Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina,* cited in § 70 above, at § 70; *Brecknell v. The United Kingdom,* no. 32457/04, judgment of 27 November 2007, § 62).
21. However, the Panel considers that, in the context of most serious crimes committed against civilian populations, Article 2 requires that the authorities take all investigative efforts in order to establish the facts and bring perpetrators to justice. Such cases shall be given the highest priority.
22. The Panel also notes that its task is not to review relevant practices or alleged obstacles to the conduct of effective investigations *in abstracto*, but only in relation to their specific application to the particular circumstances of a situation subject of a complaint before it (see, ECtHR, *Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom*, judgment of 29 November 1988, § 53, Series A no. 145-B). The Panel therefore determines that the nature and degree of scrutiny to determine whether the effectiveness of the investigation satisfies the minimum threshold depends on the circumstances of the particular case. For these reasons, the Panel considers that it will establish with regard to each case if all reasonable steps were taken to conduct an effective investigation as prescribed by Article 2, having regard to the realities of the investigative work in Kosovo.
23. The Panel puts on record that it has already analysed the effectiveness under Article 2 of numerous investigations conducted by UNMIK with respect to killings, abductions and disappearances related to the conflict in Kosovo. The Panel has identified common shortcomings in these investigations such as delays in the registration of the cases and lengthy periods of inactivity from the outset and in the period within the Panel’s jurisdiction; failure to take basic investigative steps and follow obvious lines of enquiry; lack of coordination among different units of UNMIK Police; lack of regular and meaningful reviews of cases; lack of prosecutorial oversight and failure to provide family members with minimum necessary information on the status of the investigation (compare with ECtHR, *Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia*, cited in § 71 above, § 123). The Panel also records systemic failures such as a deficient system of setting investigative priorities and lack of proper handover. In the great majority of these cases the Panel has found that the investigations were not effective in the meaning of Article 2 and that UNMIK’s failures, which persisted throughout the period of the Panel’s jurisdiction, could not be justified in the light of difficulties encountered by UNMIK at the beginning of its mission.
24. *Compliance with Article 2 in the present case*

1. With respect to the present case, the Panel notes that there were obvious shortcomings in the conduct of the investigation from the outset. However, in light of the considerations developed above concerning its limited temporal jurisdiction (see § 45 above), the Panel recalls that it is competent *ratione temporis* to evaluate the compliance of the investigations with Article 2 of the ECHR only for the period after 23 April 2005, while taking into consideration the state of the case at that date (see ECtHR, *Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina,* cited in § 70 above, at § 70). The period under review ends on 9 December 2008, with EULEX taking over responsibility in the area of administration of justice (see § 21 above).
2. The Panel recalls the complainant’s statement that the abduction of Mr Lj. B. was immediately was reported to the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the ICRC, KFOR and UNMIK. The SRSG states that on 30 November 1999 UNMIK Police MPU opened a file under the name of Mr. Lj. B.
3. Although the SRSG states that the UNMIK Police tried to identify and locate the alleged witness and alleged suspect, there is no evidence in the file that any substantive effort was actually made. The investigative file shows that the only investigative actions carried out by the UNMIK Police on this case was an attempt to identify and locate the named witness and suspect on an “available database”, sending two memos to KFOR, one in 2000 to KFOR Command and one in 2004 to the Commander of Camp Bondsteel respectively (see §34 above), researching web pages and contacting the wife and mother of Mr Lj. B. for updated information. Further, there is no evidence in the file that UNMIK Police took any other basic step, such as “canvassing” the neighbourhood in which Mr Lj. B. was living, to locate and interview this and other potential witnesses who could shed light on the circumstances surrounding the abduction. There are no documents on file indicating that UNMIK sought the cooperation of the Yugoslavian/Serbian Police, Interpol or any other body in locating either the named witness or the named suspect.
4. Coming to the period within its jurisdiction, starting from 23 April 2005, the Panel notes that after that critical date the failure to conduct the necessary investigative actions persisted, thus, in accordance with the continuing obligation to investigate (see § 66 above), bringing the assessment of the whole investigation within the period of the Panel’s jurisdiction.
5. The Panel notes that during this period UNMIK had in its possession an allegation that was reported to it that Mr Lj. B. was possibly detained at some time in Camp Bondsteel. There was information in the file that two letters were sent by investigating UNMIK officers to KFOR Main in 2000 and the Commander of Camp Bondsteel in 2004 but with no response. However, during this period no further investigative action was taken by UNMIK.
6. By 2005 the international community was clearly aware of the practice of detaining persons incommunicado in the region (see Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Report, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, *Alleged Secret Detentions in Council of Europe Member States*, AS/Jur (2006) 03, 22 January 2006; *ECtHR El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, no. [39630/09](http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{"appno":["39630/09"]}), § 37). In determining whether Mr. Lj. B. was being, or had been, detained, the subsequent failure of KFOR to respond to the two written enquiries did not close the door to investigation. Given UNMIK’s role as the provisional authority in Kosovo, it had the authority to address this at a higher-level, but this was not done.In this respect, it should be recalled that the ECtHR has held that a respondent State must be regarded as responsible under the Convention for acts performed by foreign officials on its territory with the acquiescence or connivance of its authorities (see ECtHR *Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia*, no. 48787/99, § 318; and *El-Masri,* cited above*,* § 206).
7. By this time UNMIK was aware that KFOR detained prisoners in Camp Bondsteel with no external civilian or judicial oversight and that the latter regularly failed to respond to queries regarding detainees. The European Parliament, Temporary Committee on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners, issued a Report titled *On the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners* (A6-0020/2007, 30 January 2007), specifically highlighting the failure of KFOR in providing access to their facilities. It stated:

*“180. Expresses deep concern over the fact that the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) obtained access to NATO-run detention facilities in Kosovo only in July 2006;*

*181. Regrets the refusal of NATO to provide evidence on the allegations of illegal detention of terrorist suspects in the prison run by the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR) at Camp Bondsteel, the only detention facility in Europe where CPT inspectors were not allowed unlimited access until very recently;*

*182. Points out in this respect that the testimony given to the Temporary Committee by the former Kosovo Ombudsman, Marek Antoni Nowicki, confirmed that from July 1999, inmates were frequently detained at Camp Bondsteel, subject only to a decision by the Commander of KFOR and subject to no judicial decision or any form of other external control; recalls that from 2000 to 2001, a number of people were detained also following administrative decisions of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General and that, according to official data available, 23 people were imprisoned at Camp Bondsteel for a short period of time by the KFOR Commander in connection with violent events in Kosovo in spring 2004;”*

1. The Panel considers that, as the mortal remains of Mr Lj. B. had not been located and those responsible for the crime had not been identified, UNMIK was obliged to use the means at its disposal to regularly review the progress of the investigation to ensure that nothing had been overlooked and any new evidence had been considered, as well as to inform his relatives regarding any possible new leads of enquiry.
2. In light of the above, the Panel cannot agree with the SRSG’s conclusion that the lack of feedback from KFOR and that the lack of witnesses or suspects impeded the identification of the perpetrators. In this regard, the Panel, again, stresses that almost any investigation at its initial stage lacks information. Finding the necessary information to fill those gaps is the main goal of any investigative activity. Therefore, a lack of information at the beginning of the investigation should not be used as an argument to defend inaction by the investigative authorities. The file, as made available to the Panel, does not show any such activity. Thus, it appears that UNMIK Police simply waited for further information to appear by itself. In the Panel’s view, such a passivity by UNMIK Police may have led to the loss of potential evidence (see the Panel’s approach in the case *Ð.L.*, no. 88/09, opinion of 22 November 2013, at § 123).
3. The apparent lack of an adequate reaction from UNMIK Police, and of any adequate action at later stages, may have suggested to the perpetrators that the authorities were either not able, or not willing to investigate such criminal acts. Moreover, the lack of a more assertive approach with obtaining a response from KFOR suggests to the community that the latter is above the law. Such an attitude of the authorities towards the gravest crimes in any society, and especially in post-conflict circumstances, inevitably creates a culture of impunity among the criminals and can only lead to a worsening of the situation. The problems that UNMIK had encountered at the beginning of its mission, which were discussed above, do not justify such inaction, either at the outset or subsequently.
4. The Panel is also aware that the duty to investigate is not breached merely because the investigation does not produce a satisfactory result. Nevertheless, such an investigation must be undertaken in a serious manner and not be a mere formality. In this respect, the Panel also recalls the position of the European Court that “the authorities always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation” (see § 71 above).
5. The Panel considers that, having regard to all the circumstances of the particular case, not all reasonable steps were taken by UNMIK towards towards locating and identifying the mortal remains of Mr Lj. B. and identifying the perpetrators and bringing them to justice. In this sense the Panel considers that the investigation was not adequate and did not comply with the requirements of promptness, expedition and effectiveness (see § 70 above), as required by Article 2 of the ECHR.
6. In relation to the procedural requirement of public scrutiny, the Panel recalls that Article 2 also entails that the victim’s next-of-kin be involved in the investigation to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests.
7. The investigative file shows that the only contact between UNMIK investigators and Mr Lj. B.’s family members was a telephone interview with the complainant in March 2005. No further contact is documented in the file such as informing the complainant and her family about the status of the investigation. There is no record of UNMIK informing the family of its efforts in contacting KFOR to determine the veracity of the allegation that Mr. Lj. B. was held in detention there and subsequently killed while trying to escape.
8. The Panel recalls the SRSG’s comment that the present case is similar to other cases of killings, abductions and disappearances where UNMIK’s investigations “inevitably” stalled due to the lack of evidence and witnesses (see § 59 above). For its part, the Panel, in light of the shortcomings and deficiencies in the investigation described above, considers that the case of Mr Lj. B., as well as other cases of killings, abductions and disappearances previously examined, well exemplify a pattern of perfunctory and unproductive investigations conducted by the UNMIK Police into killings and disappearances in Kosovo (see § 87 above; compare with HRC, *Abubakar Amirov and Aïzan Amirova v. Russian Federation*, cited in § 82 above, at § 11.4, HRAP, *Bulatović*, no. 166/09, opinion of 13 November 2014, §§ 85 and 101
9. In light of the deficiencies and shortcomings described above, the Panel concludes that UNMIK failed to carry out an effective investigation into the abduction and disappearance of Mr Lj. B. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 2, procedural limb, of the ECHR.
10. **Alleged violation of Article 3 of the ECHR**
11. The Panel considers that the complainant invokes, in substance, a violation of the right to be free from inhumane or degrading treatment arising out of the abduction and disappearance of her husband, as guaranteed by Article 3 of the ECHR.
12. **The scope of the Panel’s review**
13. The Panel will consider the allegations under Article 3 of the ECHR, applying the same scope of review as was set out with regard to Article 2 (see §§ 42 - 45 above).
14. The Panel recalls that the European Court of Human Rights has found on many occasions that a situation of enforced disappearance gives rise to a violation of Article 3 in respect of close relatives of the victim. It emphasises that, concerning Article 3, the essence of such a violation does not so much lie in the fact of the ‘disappearance’ of the family member but rather concerns the authorities’ reactions and attitudes to the situation when it is brought to their attention (see, e.g.: ECtHR [GC], *Çakici v. Turkey*, no. 23657/94, judgment of 8 July 1999, § 98, *ECHR*, 1999-IV; ECtHR [GC], *Cyprus v. Turkey*, no. 25781/94, judgment of 10 May 2001, § 156, *ECHR*, 2001-IV; ECtHR, *Orhan v. Turkey*, no. 25656/94, judgment of 18 June 2002, § 358; ECtHR, *Bazorkina v. Russia*, cited in § 81 above, at § 139; ECtHR, *Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina,* cited in § 70 above, at § 74; ECtHR, *Alpatu Israilova v. Russia*, no. 15438/05, judgment of 14 March 2013, § 69; see also HRAP, *Zdravković*, no. 46/08, decision of 17 April 2009, § 41). “It is especially in respect of the latter that a relative may claim directly to be a victim of the authorities’ conduct” (see, among others, ECtHR, *Er and Others v. Turkey*, no. 23016/04, judgment of 31 July 2012, § 94).
15. Lastly, where mental suffering caused by the authorities’ reactions to the disappearance is at stake, the alleged violation is contrary to the substantive element of Article 3 of the ECHR, not its procedural element, as is the case with regard to Article 2 (ECtHR, *Gelayevy v. Russia*, no. 20216/07, judgment of 15 July 2010, §§ 147 - 148).
16. **The Parties’ submissions**
17. The complainant alleges that the lack of information and certainty surrounding the abduction and disappearance of Mr Lj. B., particularly because of UNMIK’s failure to properly investigate his disappearance, caused mental suffering to her and her family.
18. With respect to Article 3, the SRSG states that while most of the jurisprudence on Article 3 has developed in relation to disappearances attributable to the State or its agents, the European Court has also determined that a violation of Article 3 can also arise “where the failure of the authorities to respond to the quest for information by the relatives or the obstacles placed in their way, leaving them to bear the brunt of the efforts to uncover any facts, may be regarded as disclosing a flagrant, continuous and callous disregard of an obligation to account for the whereabouts and fate of a missing person”.
19. Concerning the case at issue, the SRSG acknowledges the existence of a close relationship between the complainant and Mr Lj. B., albeit mistakenly identifying her as his mother, when the complainant is his wife. The SRSG argues that there is no documentation on record to indicate that either the complainant or any other close relative made inquiries to UNMIK MPU/WCIU. With respect to the conduct of the authorities, the SRSG argues that no allegations have been made by the complainant “of any bad faith on the part of the UNMIK personnel involved in the matter, nor of any attitude by UNMIK that would have evidenced disregard for the seriousness of the matter or the emotions of the Complainant emanating from the continued missing status of their relatives”. The SRSG further states that the investigative file shows that UNMIK investigators had a telephone interview with the complainant, who at that time was residing in Serbia proper, regarding the circumstances of the disappearance of her husband. For this reason, in the SRSG’s view, “there is no documentation or claim that UNMIK acted inappropriately or with an attitude of the type required for finding to a violation of Article 3, ECHR”.
20. The SRSG does not dispute the mental anguish and suffering of the complainant; however he argues that this is not attributable to UNMIK as it is rather “a result of the inherent suffering that results from the disappearance of a close family member”. He states that, in this sense, the European Court has held that the suffering family members must have a “character distinct” from the emotional distress which may be regarded as inevitably caused to the relatives of a victim of a serious human rights violation.
21. The SRSG therefore argues that there has been no violation of Article 3.
22. **The Panel’s assessment**
23. *General principles concerning the obligation under Article 3*
24. Like Article 2, Article 3 of the ECHR enshrines one of the most fundamental values in democratic societies (ECtHR, *Talat Tepe v. Turkey*, no. 31247/96, 21 December 2004, § 47; ECtHR [GC], *Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia*, cited in § 93 above, at § 424). As confirmed by the absolute nature conferred on it by Article 15 § 2 of the ECHR, the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment still applies even in most difficult circumstances.
25. Setting out the general principles applicable to situations where violations of the obligation under Article 3 of the ECHR are alleged, the Panel notes that the phenomenon of disappearance constitutes a complex form of human rights violation that must be understood and confronted in an integral fashion (see IACtHR, *Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras*, cited in § 64 above, at § 150).
26. The Panel observes that the obligation under Article 3 of the ECHR differs from the procedural obligation on the authorities under Article 2. Whereas the latter requires the authorities to take specific legal action capable of leading to identification and punishment of those responsible, the former is more general and humanitarian and relates to their reaction to the plight of the relatives of those who have disappeared or died.
27. The HRC has also recognised disappearances as a serious violation of human rights. In its decision of 21 July 1983, in the case *Quinteros v. Urugay*, it stated that disappearances constitute serious violations of the rights of the disappeared person’s relatives, who suffer from deep anguish which persists for as long as the uncertainty concerning the fate of their loved one continues, often for many years (see HRC, Communication No. 107/1981, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 at 138 (1990), § 14). Moreover, in its decision of 15 July 1994 in the case *Mojica v. Dominican Republic*, the HRC has deemed that “the disappearance of persons is inseparably linked to treatment that amounts to a violation of article 7 [of the Covenant]”, also prohibiting torture, inhumane or degrading treatment and punishment (see HRC, Communication No. 449/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/449/1991 (1994), § 5.7).
28. With respect to the question whether a member of the family of a disappeared person can be considered the victim of a treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR, the Panel refers to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and to its own case law. The European Court accepts that this may be the case, depending on the existence of “special factors which give the suffering of the [family member] a dimension and character distinct from the emotional distress which may be regarded as inevitably caused to relatives of a victim of a serious human rights violation”. The Court further holds that “relevant elements will include the proximity of the family tie, the particular circumstances of the relationship, the extent to which the family member witnessed the events in question, the involvement of the family member in the attempts to obtain information about the disappeared person and the way in which the authorities responded to those enquiries” (see ECtHR, *Basayeva and Others v. Russia*, nos. 15441/05 and 20731/04, judgment of 28 May 2009, § 159; ECtHR, *Er and Others v. Turkey*, cited in § 106 above, at § 94).
29. The Panel takes note that, when assessing the emotional suffering of the victims, the European Court also considers the following circumstances: the length of the disappearance itself and of the period with no information on the fate of the missing person and on the investigation undertaken by the authorities; the delay in initiation of criminal investigation into the disappearance; the absence of any “meaningful” action by the authorities, despite the fact that the complainants approached them to report the disappearance of their relative and to share with them the information they had; lack of any plausible explanation or information as to the fate of their missing relatives despite personal or written inquiries with official bodies (see, among others, ECtHR, *Er and Others v. Turkey,* cited above, § 96; ECtHR, *Osmanoğlu v. Turkey,* no. 48804/99, judgment of 24 January 2008, § 97). Another factor leading to a finding of violation of Article 3 of the ECHR is the continuous nature of the psychological suffering of relatives of a victim of a disappearance (ECtHR, *Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine,* no. 28005/08, judgment of 14 March 2013, § 201).
30. The HRC has also considered the issue and recognised family members of disappeared or missing persons as victims of a violation of Article 7 of the Covenant: parents (*Boucherf v. Algeria*, Communication No. 1196/2003, views of 30 March 2006, § 9.7, CCPR/C/86/D/1196/2003), children (*Zarzi v. Algeria*, Communication No. 1780/2008, views of 22 March 2011, § 7.6, CCPR/C/101/D/1780/2008), siblings (*El Abani v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,* Communication No. 1640/2007, views of 26 July 2010, § 7.5, CCPR/C/99/D/1640/2007), spouses (*Bousroual v. Algeria*, Communication No. 992/2001, views of 30 March 2006, § 9.8, CCPR/C/86/D/992/2001), aunts and uncles (*Benaniza v Algeria,* views of 26 July 2010, § 9.4, CCPR/C/99/D/1588/2007) (*Bashasha v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya*, views of 20 October 2010, § 7.2, CCPR/C/100/D/1776/2008). It justifies this broad understanding of victim status by the suffering and distress that is caused to family members by the disappearance of an individual, which is often exacerbated by the authorities’ insufficient efforts to investigate the disappearance in order to establish the fate of the victim and to bring perpetrators to justice (*Aboussedra v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya*, Communication No. 1751/2008, views of 25 October 2010, § 7.5, CCPR/C/100/D/1751/2008). In the case *Amirov v. Russian Federation* the Committee observed that “[w]ithout wishing to spell out all the circumstances of indirect victimisation, the Committee considers that the failure of a State party responsibly to discharge its obligations to investigate and clarify the circumstances of the harm suffered by the direct victim will be usually be a factor. Additional factors may be necessary. In the present case, the Committee notes the horrific conditions in which the author came to find his wife's mutilated remains (…), followed by the dilatory, sporadic measures undertaken to investigate the circumstances that have lead to the above findings of violations of articles 6 and 7, read together with article 2, paragraph 3. The Committee considers that, taken together, the circumstances require the Committee to conclude that the author's own rights under article 7 have also been violated” (HRC, *Abubakar Amirov and Aïzan Amirova v. Russian Federation*, cited in § 82 above, at § 11.7).
31. The Panel also takes into account that according to the European Court, the analysis of the authorities’ reaction should not be confined to any specific manifestation of the authorities’ attitudes, isolated incidents or procedural acts; on the contrary, in the Court’s view, an assessment of the way in which the authorities of the respondent State reacted to the applicants’ enquiries should be global and continuous (see ECtHR, *Açiș v. Turkey*, no. 7050/05, judgment of 1 February 2011, § 45).
32. In this respect, it is the position of the European Court that findings under the procedural limb of Article 2 would also be of direct relevance in considering the existence of a violation of Article 3 (see ECtHR, *Basayeva and Others v. Russia*, cited in § 116 above, at § 109; ECtHR, *Gelayevy v. Russia*, cited in § 107 above, at § 147; ECtHR, *Bazorkina v. Russia*, cited in § 81 above, at § 140).
33. The Panel observes that the European Court has already found violations of Article 3 of the ECHR in relation to disappearances in which the State itself was found to be responsible for the abduction (see ECtHR, *Luluyev and Others v. Russia*, no. 69480/01, judgment of 9 November 2006, §§ 117 - 118; ECtHR, *Kukayev v. Russia*, no. 29361/02, judgment of 15 November 2007, §§ 107 - 110). However, in contrast, in the case under the Panel’s consideration, in no way is UNMIK implicated in the actual disappearance and UNMIK cannot be held responsible for the applicant’s mental distress caused by the commission of the crime itself.
34. The Panel is mindful that in the absence of a finding of State responsibility for the disappearance, the European Court has ruled that it is not persuaded that the authorities’ conduct, albeit negligent to the extent that it has breached Article 2 in its procedural aspect, could have in itself caused the applicant mental distress in excess of the minimum level of severity, which is necessary in order to consider treatment as falling within the scope of Article 3 (see, among others, ECtHR, *Tovsultanova v. Russia*, no. 26974/06, judgment of 17 June 2010, § 104; ECtHR, *Shafiyeva v. Russia*, no. 49379/09, judgment of 3 May 2012, § 103).
35. *Applicability of Article 3 to the Kosovo context*
36. With regard to the applicability of the above standards to the Kosovo context, the Panel first refers to its view on the same issue with regard to Article 2, developed above (see §§ 74 - 85 above).
37. The Panel reiterates that a normally functioning law enforcement system should take into account the protection needs of victims and witnesses, as well as to consider the special vulnerability of displaced persons in post-conflict situations. The Panel has already considered the fact that by 2003 the police and justice system in Kosovo was described by the UN Secretary-General as being “well-functioning” and “sustainable” (see § 19 above).
38. The Panel again notes that it will not review relevant practices or alleged obstacles to the conduct of effective investigations *in abstracto*, but only in relation to their specific application to the complaint before it, considering the particular circumstances of the case.
39. For these reasons, the Panel considers that it has to establish with regard to each case whether the attitude and reactions of UNMIK authorities to the disappearance itself and to the complainants’ quest for information with regard to the fate of their relatives and the criminal investigation, would amount to a violation of the obligation under Article 3, having regard to the realities in Kosovo at the relevant time.
40. *Compliance with Article 3 in the present case*
41. Against this background, the Panel discerns a number of factors in the present case which, taken together, raise the question of violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.
42. The Panel notes the proximity of the family ties between the complainant and Mr Lj. B., as the latter is the complainant’s husband.
43. The Panel recalls the failure established above in relation to the procedural obligation under Article 2, despite the fact that UNMIK Police had the minimum necessary information to pursue investigation from the outset. In this respect, the Panel reiterates that from the standpoint of Article 3 it may examine UNMIK’s reactions and attitudes to the complainant in their entirety.
44. At the time of her latest submission to the Panel in April 2009, the complainant states that, approximately ten years since the abduction and disappearance of Mr Lj. B., she had received no information on her husband’s whereabouts or on the status of the investigation. The Panel recalls that the only recorded contact between the complainant and UNMIK authorities was in 2005.
45. Drawing inferences from UNMIK’s failure to provide a plausible explanation for the absence of any contact with the complainant, the Panel considers that this situation, which continued into the period of the Panel’s temporal jurisdiction, caused grave uncertainty to the complainant and her family about Lj. B.’s fate and the status of the investigation.
46. In view of the above, the Panel concludes that the complainant has suffered severe distress and anguish for a prolonged and continuing period of time on account of the way the authorities of UNMIK have dealt with the case and as a result of her inability to find out what happened to her husband. In this respect, it is obvious that, in any situation, the pain of a wife who has to live in uncertainty about the fate of her husband must be unbearable.
47. For the aforementioned reasons, the Panel concludes that, by its behaviour, UNMIK contributed to the complainant’s distress and mental suffering in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.
48. **CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**
49. In light of the Panel’s findings in this case, the Panel is of the opinion that some form of reparation is necessary.
50. The Panel notes that enforced disappearances constitute serious violations of human rights which shall be investigated and prosecuted under any circumstances. The Panel also notes that UNMIK as the territorial administration of Kosovo from 1999 to 2008 had the primary responsibility to effectively investigate the abduction and disappearance of Mr Lj. B., and that its failure to do so constitutes a further serious violation of the rights of the victims and their next-of-kin, in particular the right to have the truth of the matter determined.
51. The Panel notes the SRSG’s own concerns that the inadequate resources, especially at the outset of UNMIK’s mission, made compliance with UNMIK’s human rights obligations difficult to achieve.
52. It would normally be for UNMIK to take the appropriate measures in order to put an end to the violation noted and to redress as far as possible the effects thereof. However, as the Panel noted above (see § 20 above), UNMIK’s responsibility with regard to the administration of justice in Kosovo ended on 9 December 2008. UNMIK therefore is no longer in a position to take measures that will have a direct impact on the investigations that are still pending before EULEX or local authorities. Likewise, following the unilateral declaration of independence by the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of Self-Government on 17 February 2008 and subsequently, the entry into force of the Kosovo Constitution on 15 June 2008, UNMIK ceased to perform executive functions in Kosovo, this fact limiting its ability to provide full and effective reparation of the violation committed, as required by established principles of international human rights law. However, it is also obvious from the file that there has been absolutely no action taken by EULEX in this matter since the hand-over.

1. The panel recognises the limited power that the local authorities in Kosovo have with respect to instructing KFOR to provide any disclosure while UNMIK has military Liaison Officers who maintain contact with KFOR.
2. The Panel considers that situation described above does not relieve UNMIK from its obligation to redress as far as possible the effects of the violations for which it is responsible.

**With respect to the complainant and the case the Panel considers appropriate that UNMIK:**

**-** In line with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on situations of limited State jurisdiction (see ECtHR [GC], *Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia*, cited in § 93 above, at § 333; ECtHR, *Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom*, no. 61498/08, judgment of 2 March 2010, § 171; ECtHR [GC]), *Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia*, nos. 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06, judgment of 19 October 2012, § 109), must endeavour, with all the means available to it *vis-à-vis* competent authorities in Kosovo, to obtain assurances that the investigations concerning the case at issue will be continued in compliance with the requirements of an effective investigation as envisaged by Article 2, that the circumstances surrounding the abduction and disappearance of Mr Lj. B. will be established and that the possible perpetrators will be brought to justice. The complainant and/or other next-of-kin shall be informed of such proceedings and relevant documents shall be disclosed to them, as necessary;

**-** Publicly acknowledges, within a reasonable time, responsibility with respect to UNMIK’s failure to adequately investigate the abduction and disappearance of Mr Lj. B., as well as the distress and mental suffering subsequently incurred, and makes a public apology, including through public media, to the complainant and her family in this regard;

**-** Request KFOR to provide any information with respect to the detention or other contact with Mr Lj. B. as well as any of the named witnesses and suspects and forward this information to both the family and to EULEX;

**-** Takes appropriate steps towards payment of adequate compensation to the complainant for the moral damage suffered due to UNMIK’s failure to conduct an effective investigation as well as for distress and mental suffering incurred by him as a consequence of UNMIK’s behaviour.

**The Panel also considers appropriate that UNMIK:**

**-** In line with the UN General Assembly Resolution on “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law” (A/Res/60/147, 21 March 2006), takes appropriate steps, through other UN affiliated entities operating in Kosovo, local bodies and non-governmental organisations, for the realisation of a full and comprehensive reparation programme, including restitution compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition, for the victims from all communities of serious violations of human rights which occurred during and in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict;

**-** Takes appropriate steps before competent bodies of the United Nations, including the UN Secretary-General, towards the allocation of adequate human and financial resources to ensure that international human rights standards are upheld at all times by the United Nations, including when performing administrative and executive functions over a territory, and to make provision for effective and independent monitoring.

**FOR THESE REASONS,**

The Panel, unanimously,

1. **FINDS THAT THERE HAS BEEN A VIOLATION OF THE PROCEDURAL OBLIGATION UNDER ARTICLE 2 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS;**
2. **FINDS THAT THERE HAS BEEN A VIOLATION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE OBLIGATION UNDER ARTICLE 3 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, IN RELATION TO THE ABDUCTION AND DISAPPEARANCE OF MR LJ. B.;**
3. **RECOMMENDS THAT UNMIK:**
4. **URGES THE COMPETENT AUTHORITIES IN KOSOVO TO TAKE ALL POSSIBLE STEPS IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE ABDUCTION AND DISAPPEARANCE OF MR LJ. B., IS CONTINUED IN COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 2 OF THE ECHR AND THAT THE PERPETRATORS ARE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE;**
5. **PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGES, INCLUDING THROUGH PUBLIC MEDIA, RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS FAILURE TO CONDUCT AN EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION INTO THE ABDUCTION AND DISAPPEARANCE OF MR LJ. B., AS WELL AS FOR DISTRESS AND MENTAL SUFFERING INCURRED, AND MAKES A PUBLIC APOLOGY TO THE COMPLAINANT AND HER FAMILY;**
6. **REQUEST KFOR TO PROVIDE ANY DETAILS WITH RESPECT TO DETENTION OR CONTACT WITH MR LJ. B. AND ANY OF THE NAMED WITNESSES AND SUSPECTS IN THE CASE;**
7. **TAKES APPROPRIATE STEPS TOWARDS PAYMENT OF ADEQUATE COMPENSATION TO THE COMPLAINANT FOR MORAL DAMAGE IN RELATION TO THE FINDING OF VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 2 AND ARTICLE 3 OF THE ECHR.**
8. **TAKES APPROPRIATE STEPS TOWARDS THE REALISATION OF A FULL AND COMPREHENSIVE REPARATION PROGRAMME;**
9. **TAKES APPROPRIATE STEPS AT THE UNITED NATIONS AS A GUARANTEE OF NON REPETITION;**
10. **TAKES IMMEDIATE AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PANEL AND TO INFORM THE COMPLAINANT AND THE PANEL ABOUT FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS CASE.**

 Andrey Antonov Christine Chinkin

 Executive Officer Presiding Member

*Annex*

**ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

**CCPR -** International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

**DOJ** - Department of Justice

**DPPO** - District Public Prosecutor’s Office

**ECHR** - European Convention on Human Rights

**ECtHR**- European Court of Human Rights

**EU** – European Union

**EULEX** - European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

**FRY** - Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

**HRAP** - Human Rights Advisory Panel

**HRC** - United Nation Human Rights Committee

**IACtHR**– Inter-American Court of Human Rights

**ICMP** - International Commission of Missing Persons

**ICRC** - International Committee of the Red Cross

**ICTY** - International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia

**JIC** - Joint Implementation Commission (KFOR)

**KFOR** - International Security Force (commonly known as Kosovo Force)

**KLA** - Kosovo Liberation Army

**MPU** - Missing Persons Unit

**MUP** - Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia

**NATO** - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

**OMPF** - Office on Missing Persons and Forensics

**OSCE** - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

**SRSG** - Special Representative of the Secretary-General

**UN** - United Nations

**UNHCR** - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

**UNMIK** - United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

**U.S.** – United States of America

**VRIC** - Victim Recovery and Identification Commission

**WCIU** - War Crimes Investigation Unit

1. A list of abbreviations and acronyms contained in the text can be found in the attached Annex. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The references drawn upon by the Panel in setting out this general background include: OSCE, “As Seen, as Told”, Vol. 1 (October 1998 – June 1999) and Vol. II (14 June – 31 October 1999); quarterly reports of the UN Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo; UNMIK Police Annual Reports (2000, 2001); Humanitarian Law Centre, “Abductions and Disappearances of non-Albanians in Kosovo” (2001); Humanitarian Law Centre, “Kosovo Memory Book” (htpp://www.kosovomemorybook.org); UNMIK Office on Missing Persons and Forensics, Activity Report 2002-2004; European Court of Human Rights, *Behrami and Behrami v. France* and *Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway*, nos 71412/01 and78166/01, decision of 2 May 2007; International Commission on Missing Persons, “The Situation in Kosovo: a Stock Taking” (2010); data issued by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, (available at [www.unhchr.org](http://www.unhchr.org)) and by the International Committee of the Red Cross (available at <http://familylinks.icrc.org/kosovo/en>). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Accessed on 12 December 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The OMPF database is not open to public. The Panel accessed it with regard to this case on 09 December 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The ICMP database is available at: http://www.ic-mp.org/fdmsweb/index.php?w=mp\_details&l=en (accessed on 10 December 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)